The term "collateral" refers to a tangible asset or a secure financial
asset, such as a gov- ernment bond, which is used to guarantee a debt
issued by the owner of the asset. The existence of collateral is intended
to make the debt less risky, as the creditor has a legal claim on the asset
in the case of default by the debtor. As such, collateral is fundamental to
the smooth functioning of financial markets.
In this sense, collateral is part of a significant number of lending and
borrowing trans- actions undertaken by market participants. For instance,
source collateral is provided to investment banks by hedge funds and
commercial banks directly, and by other financial market participants such
as pension funds and insurers via their custodians (Singh, 2012). While the
existence of collateral is crucial to the individual investor, particularly
the creditor, collateral also plays an important role in the financial
system at the macro- economic level, notably because source collateral is
frequently re-pledged, which allows for the creation of collateral chains
and hence an interdependent network of lending and borrowing transactions
at the aggregate level.
Although this process adds to the so-called lubrication of the financial
system, it also introduces an element of fragility, as became evident
during the financial crisis of 2008-09.
For instance, the crisis that followed the collapse of the investment bank
Lehman Brothers on 15 September 2008 led to a significant shortening of
collateral chains as well as a fall in the velocity, or the rate of reuse,
of collateral (ibid.), which further aggravated an existing liquidity
shortage. In the aftermath of the 2008-09 financial crisis, concerns were
also raised that the pool of collateral had shrunk owing to decreasing
confidence in many governments' ability to honour their debt commitments.
However, such think- ing is flawed in the case of countries like the United
States, because a government with monetary sovereignty, and therefore a
full capacity to issue its own currency as well as a willingness to honour
its debt can never, by definition, be forced into default by any economic
circumstance. The case of euroland provides greater room for debate, by
con- trast, as all euro-area member countries have relinquished their
monetary sovereignty and thus the ability to independently issue their own
currency.
Concerns with the role of collateral in propagating business cycles have
greater valid- ity and have benefited from significant attention in
economic literature. In an economic downturn, as the price of both tangible
and financial collateral falls, while simultaneously collateralization and
margin requirements increase, potential borrowers find it ever more
challenging to secure a loan. This process contributes to a hastier
tightening of credit conditions, possibly aggravating and prolonging the
economic downturn. However, the literature in this field must be considered
with caution, as some models used to study this mechanism, particularly as
regards monetary policy, use many assumptions that have been debased by
recent developments in economic theory and the US experience during the
financial crisis of 2008-09. Assumptions of exogenous money as well as
significant changes in inflation rates and thereby in the redistribution of
wealth between lenders and borrowers as a result of unanticipated monetary
policy shocks (see, for example, Cordoba and Ripoll, 2004) are not only
theoretically questionable, but have also been discredited by the monetary
policy experience in the aftermath of the 2008-09 financial crisis.
Nonetheless, in an economy with endogenous money - that is, where the
quantity of money is determined in the process of credit provision -
collateral is undoubt- edly fundamental to understanding credit constraints
and bank-based financial crises (Ramskogler, 2011).
The evolving role of collateral in many modern economies, such as that of
the United States, is thus also crucial to the conduct of monetary policy
by the central bank. The efficacy with which the banking system transforms
otherwise illiquid assets into liquidity via collateralization in the
absence of financial strain means that, when a financial crisis occurs,
some of the central bank's traditional tools that aim to provide liquidity
to the banking system prove inadequate. In some cases, policies
traditionally viewed as expansionary, such as the purchase of government
bonds in exchange for reserves at the central bank, prove contractionary,
as the policy decreases the stock of valuable collateral (government bonds)
that are an essential element in the liquidity creation process of the
banking system (Williamson, 2011).
The transformation of the regulatory framework that began following the
collapse of Lehman Brothers and the ensuing financial crisis, particularly
in the over-the-counter financial products market (Bank for International
Settlements, 2013), may lead to a collateral shortage in the long term (van
Steenis et al., 2013). Such a collateral short- age, if it occurs, could be
a significant drag on economic activity, as it will constrain the
loan-creation process that is a fundamental driver of economic growth. On
the other hand, over-zealous reuse of collateral, which leads to a masking
of underlying risk and the creation of excessive leverage in certain
sectors of the economy, was itself one of the fundamental causes of the
2008-09 financial crisis. At the peak of the crisis, the US Federal Reserve
took a number of unprecedented steps to ease credit conditions and restore
financial stability, with one such step involving a significant expansion
of the list of collateral accepted under various loan programmes of the
central bank. While this most likely contributed to the reparation of the
functioning of financial markets across the world, this measure along with
others taken by the US central bank also sparked a debate as to whether the
Federal Reserve had overstepped its mandate, entering into the realm of
fiscal rather than monetary policy (Wray, 2012).
See also:
Endogenous money; Federal Reserve System; Financial crisis; Investment
banking; Open-market operations.
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