Policy makers define exchange-rate regimes in agreement with monetary
policy. As Vernengo and Rochon (2000, p. 77) point out, "preferences over a
specific exchange rate regime can be linked to macroeconomic policy, in
particular to whether econo- mists prefer full-employment policies or
whether they defend policies aimed at guar- anteeing price stability". As
several countries are adopting flexible exchange rates to prevent chronic
deficits in their balance of payment (many countries were forced by
speculative attacks on their national currencies to abandon fixed
exchange-rate regimes), understanding the pass-through effect - the effect
of exchange-rate fluctuations on the rate of inflation - became crucial as
well as controversial. Many central bankers, adopt- ing mainstream recipes,
are targeting inflation in order to avoid the pass-through effect,
considering that exchange-rate devaluations have had substantial impacts on
domestic prices. In many cases, policy makers have focused primarily on
price stability, leaving aside full-employment policies.
Mainstream models rely on assumptions that market imperfections lessen the
exchange rate pass-through effect. In general, these theoretical models
assume that when an exog- enous change in the exchange rate occurs,
domestic firms will only partially pass its costs to final prices, so that
either the prices are sticky in domestic currency in the short run or firms
are engaged in price discrimination. Krugman (1987) refers to the second
case as "pricing to market", as firms do not change domestic prices
automatically, but only proportionally to the firm's elasticity of demand.
Post-Keynesian price theory emphasizes that mainstream models of
exchange-rate pass-through are inappropriate. According to Arestis and
Milberg (1993-94), particular theories of the firm define the differences
between post-Keynesian and neoclassical theo- ries of the exchange-rate
pass-through. The post-Keynesian firm is an oligopolist with a specific
internal structure and set of investment requirements, based on its
long-run objective of survival and growth. This firm is fundamentally
different from the profit- maximizing behaviour of the neoclassical firm,
which is characterized by short-run goals. Post-Keynesian theories of
pricing in manufacturing industries are based on the full- cost principle,
in which a limited exchange-rate pass-through is a result of market imper-
fections. In Kalecki's (1971) framework, a rise in costs for domestic or
foreign firms due to a new level of the exchange rate is not fully
transmitted to prices because of the degree of monopoly. In Eichner's
(1976) model, a change in the exchange rate also affects the cost of
raising funds internally for future investments. As a result, the firm's
investment plans are altered, its markup is reduced, and the exchange rate
is passed through only to a limited degree.
In other words, whereas neoclassical models imply that partial
exchange-rate pass- through reflects market imperfections, the
post-Keynesian approach implies that partial exchange-rate pass-through
should be the norm, and there is no reason why a full or one-to-one
exchange-rate pass-through should be observed in the real world. In
neoclas- sical models, one possible explanation for recent lower
exchange-rate pass-through levels would be that markets are now less
integrated than before.
Taylor (2000) suggests an alternative explanation within the neoclassical
approach for the decline of exchange-rate pass-through in a lower
inflationary environment. For him, lower exchange-rate pass-through results
mainly because the pricing power of firms declines as well; that is,
globalization has intensified the degree of competition of domestic firms.
Therefore, under this hypothesis it might be possible, especially for
emerging market countries, to experience a transitions period, from high
and unstable inflation environments to low and stable ones, during which
the full benefits of a floating exchange-rate regime might not be observed.
However, once inflation rates stabilize at a low level, the exchange-rate
pass-through weakens and movements of the exchange rate put less pressure
on inflation, allowing the economy to fully benefit from exchange-rate
flexibility.
Baqueiro et al. (2003) also point out that the level of the exchange-rate
pass-through depends on the inflation environment. For a group of small
open economies that in recent years have experienced disinflation
processes, the level of the exchange-rate pass- through weakened as the
rate of inflation fell. This result suggests that when a low and stable
inflation environment is achieved, agents' expectations are likely to be in
line with the authorities' inflation target and thus to be less influenced
by short-term exchange- rate variations. Under such circumstances it is
difficult to understand why the "fear of floating" phenomenon should
persist. Credibility in monetary policy as well as competi- tive markets
should lead to free floating and reduced exchange-rate pass-through
effects. However, "fear of floating" is pervasive (Calvo and Reinhart,
2002).
In other words, according to conventional wisdom, partial exchange-rate
pass-through results from imperfections and sluggish price adjustment,
which seems contradictory in a more integrated world, or in a more
competitive environment associated with globali- zation, leading to the
logical result that central banks should let the exchange rate float, which
is not a feature of the real world.
From a theoretical point of view, it would seem that post-Keynesian models
would provide a sounder basis for analysis. The hypothesis that
globalization has reduced the degree of monopoly of domestic firms is
perfectly compatible with the full-cost princi- ple. However,
post-Keynesians do not argue that once lower exchange-rate pass-through
effects are established, price stability would depend on the credibility of
the central bank. Hence, the "fear of floating" phenomenon is not
associated with a lack of credibility, and is not a puzzling result. In a
post-Keynesian framework, "fear of floating" would result from the central
bankers' "fear of inflation". In a contested terrain view of central
banking - one in which monetary policy affects income distribution - the
central bank attaches considerably more importance to inflation than to
unemployment in policy deci- sions. In that case, even when exchange-rate
pass-through effects fall considerably, central banks attach greater
importance to any inflationary shock, no matter how small.
See also:
Central bank credibility; Credibility and reputation; Fear of floating;
Inflation targeting; Interest rate pass-through; Monetary policy and
income distribution; Monetary policy in a small open economy.
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