The issues of credibility and reputation of monetary authorities were
introduced by the "New classical economists", in order to develop
additional arguments in favour of monetary policy rules and against the use
of discretionary policies. Their main goal was to show that an "inflation
bias" emerges in cases where monetary policy is discretionary. Monetary
authorities are said to be credible if private agents believe in their
commit- ment to price stability. Kydland and Prescott (1977) showed that it
is in the best interests of central banks to announce a low-inflation
policy and then, if private agents believe in the policy announced, to
switch to a higher-inflation policy in order to temporarily reduce the rate
of unemployment. As a matter of consequence, central banks will have a credibility issue, because rational agents will not believe them.
This credibility issue raised by Kydland and Prescott (1977) can only arise
under very restrictive theoretical circumstances: central banks have to
make their decision first before private agents can react, the game needs
to be a one-shot one, and agents as well as the central bank must have full
information and must not cooperate.